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We review supply function equilibrium models and their predictions on market outcomes in the 
wholesale  electricity  auctions.  We  discuss  how  observable  market  characteristics  such  as 
capacity constraints, number of power suppliers, load distribution and auction format affect the 
behavior  of  suppliers  and  performance  of  the  market.  We  specifically  focus  on  the  possible 
market  power  exerted  by  pivotal  suppliers  and  the  comparison  between  discriminatory  and 
uniform-price auctions. We also describe capacity investment behavior of electricity producers in 
the restructured industry.  
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1.  Introduction 
This research mainly focuses on the generation side of the electric power industry and reviews 
the  recent  findings  on  bidding  behavior  and  market  power  issues  in  wholesale  electricity 
auctions,  and  examines  the  role  of  production  capacity  constraints  and  auction  institutions 
(discriminatory  and  uniform-price  auctions)  on  behavior  and  equilibrium  outcomes.  Supply 
function equilibrium approach is the main tool in explaining the price formation process and 
bidding behavior in electricity markets. Hence, we mostly review the results predicted by this 
approach.  We  also  discuss  the  incentives  and  behavior  of  power  producers  investing  in 
production capacity in oligopolistic electricity markets.  
  Most of the analysis studied here is based on modeling without transmission network 
constraints because bidding behavior or investment analysis with these constraints complicates 
equilibrium predictions and computations. Hence, the supply function equilibrium literature is 
missing  the  transmission  network  effects  on  equilibrium  analysis  in  wholesale  electricity 
markets. However, the results in this literature are still meaningful as they build insights as to 
market behavior in the power markets. The organization of this paper is the following. Section 2 
of  this  paper  describes  the  models  of  supply  function  equilibrium  and  explains  the  recent 
findings  on  market  equilibrium  predictions.  Section  3  considers  market  power  issues,  in 
particular, (pivotal) suppliers who have potential market power and may exercise this power 
during  certain  market  conditions.  Section  4  compares  the  outcomes  of  two  popular  auction 
formats, discriminatory (or known as pay-as-bid) and uniform-price auctions, used in wholesale 
electricity markets. In Section 5, we briefly review the capacity investment behavior of power 
producers.  Section 6 concludes with future research directions.  
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2. Supply Function Equilibrium Models and Bidding Behavior  
There  are  two  approaches  for  examining  market  outcomes  (prices,  outputs,  profits,  welfare 
losses, etc.) in electricity markets: Cournot model (the quantity choice model) and the supply 
function equilibrium approach (price-quantity pairs choice model). It is debatable which model 
better predicts the realized outcomes; however, it is clear that bidding behavior of generators is 
best  characterized  by  the  supply  function  equilibrium  (SFE)  concept  (Green  and  Newbery 
(1992), Baldick et al. (2004)).   
The supply function equilibrium model has been extensively used to study the bidding 
behavior and the exercise of market power by  sellers in multi-unit auction formats (see, for 
example, Anderson and Philpott (2002), Baldick et al. (2004), Holmberg (2008, 2009), Genc 
(2009),  Genc  and  Reynolds  (forthcoming)).  A  ‘supply  function’  is  a  strategy  specifying  the 
quantity  that  a  firm  is  willing  to  produce  as  a  function  of  the  market  price.  SFE  types  of 
strategies  are  common  in  electricity  auctions  (Baldick  and  Hogan,  2002).  In  the  day-ahead 
market (in many jurisdictions it is the main market in which most of the electricity is traded a 
day before market opens, and small portion of it is traded in the real-time market), before the 
demand (or electric load) is observed, that is a day before the actual auction, each firm submits 
an offer schedule (non-decreasing supply function) specifying the quantity that they are willing 
to  produce  as  a  function  of  its  price.  The  offer  schedule  may  be  viewed  as  a  continuous 
approximation  of  the  discrete-unit  offer  schedules  that  are  submitted  in  these  auctions.  The 
independent system operator (ISO) takes these offers, and clears the market based on the demand 
and supply forecasts. In most of the electricity markets in the world, a uniform-price auction is 
employed. The uniform market price is determined by the intersection of aggregate demand and 3 
 
aggregate supply functions. Each firm produces at the price-quantity bundle at which its own 
supply function intersects with its own residual demand curve.  
  A supply function, specifying the quantity that a firm is willing to produce as a function 
of price, may be viewed as a firm’s strategy in a game. A supply function equilibrium is a Nash 
equilibrium  in  supply  function  strategies.  A  model  utilizing  strategies  of  this  type  was  first 
formulated  by  Grossman  (1981),  and  later  studied  by  Hart  (1985).  However,  there  are  two 
problems  in  studying  SFE  in  this  environment.  First,  the  number  of  equilibria  supported  by 
supply functions is enormous. Second, with deterministic demand the firm knows its equilibrium 
residual demand for sure. Hence, by choosing either a fixed price or a fixed quantity, the firm 
can optimize its objective function. Thus, there is no incentive to implement a supply function 
strategy. However, it is shown in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) that under demand uncertainty 
firms  are  willing  to  choose  a  supply  function  strategy  rather  than  choosing  simple  price  or 
quantity  strategies.  A  supply  function  strategy  affords  a  firm  greater  flexibility,  and 
correspondingly greater profits, than fixed price or fixed quantity strategies when demand is 
uncertain. Under demand uncertainty, for each outcome of the random variable, the firm can find 
a price and a quantity that optimizes its objective function. Hence, the supply function maps each 
optimum level of price onto optimum quantity. Therefore, this strategy is better than committing 
to  fixed  price  (Bertrand  type)  or  fixed  quantity  (Cournot  type)  strategies  under  demand 
uncertainty (see Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). Although with deterministic demand there are an 
enormous number of  equilibria in supply functions, in the uncertain  environment, the set of 
equilibria  shrinks.  Under  certain  demand  and  cost  assumptions,  unique  supply  function 
equilibrium can even be obtained for symmetric oligopolies (Holmberg, 2008). Klemperer and 
Meyer (1989) (hereafter KM) solve a system of differential equations to characterize symmetric 4 
 
SFE in environments for which product demand is uncertain. For  n-firm symmetric model they 
show that there are multiple equilibria when the range of demand variation is bounded. These 
equilibria  predict  equilibrium  prices  between  the  Cournot  price  and  the  most  competitive 
marginal cost price.  
  Several papers have utilized the SFE concept to analyze various aspects of electricity 
auctions.  Examples  include  Green  and  Newbery  (1992),  Newbery  (1998),  Rudkevich,  et  al. 
(1998), Green (1999), Baldick and Hogan (2002), Anderson and Philpott (2002), Baldick et al. 
(2004), Holmberg (2008, 2009), Genc (2009), Anderson et al. (2010), and Genc and Reynolds 
(forthcoming), among others. These papers consider a variety of extensions and modifications of 
the  KM  model,  including  production  capacity  constraints,  asymmetric  firms,  potential  entry, 
multi-step cost functions, forward contracting, mixed strategies, and auction format comparisons. 
Below we review some of the above mentioned SFE papers, and others will be discussed in the 
following sections. A common feature of these papers is that they do not consider the role of 
transmission constraints on optimum bidding behavior. There are a few recent papers, which we 
will also mention, that study equilibrium predictions in oligopoly in a transmission network. 
The  first  SFE  application  paper  is  Green  and  Newbery  (1992)  who  have  studied 
competition in the British electricity spot market, which was run as a uniform-price auction until 
2001 after which it has been changed to discriminatory auction (or pay-as-bid auction).  In their 
analysis,  they  follow  the  Klemperer  and  Meyer  (1989)  paper  set  up.  Rather  than  assuming 
uncertain demand, Green and Newbery assume that demand varies deterministically over time 
during the course of a market day; deterministic variation in demand over time is mathematically 
equivalent to KM’s model of uncertain demand with bounded variation. They show that at the 
Nash equilibrium the generators, National Power and PowerGen that bid supply functions to the 5 
 
grid  dispatchers  who  meet  the  demand  at  the  lowest  cost,  make  so  much  profit  far  above 
marginal costs and cause deadweight losses. Thus, to increase the competition they suggest a 
number of firms to be increased although entry takes two to three years and requires significant 
capital  investment.  Wolfram  (1999)  using  actual  pool  outcomes  shows  that  Green  and 
Newbery’s model does not describe the market very well, and the pool prices that they predict 
are much higher than the observed prices.  One explanation for high price prediction by Green 
and Newbery could be that they assume in the symmetric model suppliers should select the 
symmetric equilibrium that yields the highest profit. 
Newbery (1998) studies competition, contracts and entry in the electricity spot markets 
using analytically tractable models. He employs a supply function type of strategy to model the 
spot market and a Cournot type strategy to model the contract market. He finds that first, if the 
number of players (competitors) increases, then the maximum price reached in the pool and the 
average  pool  prices  decrease.  Second,  if  the  industry  has  insufficient  capacity    and  new 
investment has a lower marginal cost than existing investment, then forward contracts can deter 
entry (in the sense that entrants could not offer lower priced contracts). Generators covering 
themselves with forward contracts would yield more competition in the spot market, and hence 
reduce average pool prices. 
Green (1999) studies the electricity contract market in England and Wales. He shows that 
competition in the contract markets would cause generators to sell much of their power in these 
markets and hence would result in spot prices (at the Pool) close to marginal production costs. 
He employs supply function type strategies in the two stage spot market, where there are two 
suppliers and many buyers. He also allows conjectural variations to model different degrees of 
competition in the contract markets. He finds that with the Bertrand conjecture (taking other’s 6 
 
price fixed), generators will set prices equal to marginal cost. This result is similar to Allaz and 
Villa’s (1993) competitive market outcome.  
Baldick and Hogan (2002, 2006) study capacity constrained supply function equilibria in 
electricity spot markets. They also consider stability issues of the equilibria and propose a so-
called ‘function space iteration’ method to solve the equilibria numerically.  Baldick and Hogan 
argue that asymmetries among suppliers are common in electricity markets and that SFE models 
should take this into account. They state that if the firms are asymmetric in capacities and in cost 
functions  then  the  differential  equation  approach  of  solving  supply  functions  may  not  be 
effective, because the resulting supply functions may fail to have the non-decreasing property. 
Moreover, many of the proposed possible equilibria are unstable due to the capacity constraints. 
This  instability  restricts  the  range  of  equilibria  and  eliminates  some  equilibria  that  may  be 
observed in the markets. However, they do not consider how the extent of excess capacity affects 
equilibrium predictions, nor do they consider the role that pivotal suppliers might play. 
In a recent paper, Holmberg and Newbery (2010) review supply function equilibrium and 
its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions. They provide a literature review of 
supply function models applied to analyze bidding behavior in oligopolistic electricity markets in 
the presence of price caps, forward contracts, different auction formats/mechanisms, capacity 
constraints, and some behavior restrictive market rules. They summarize the results of theoretical 
and empirical papers in the supply function literature applied to the electricity markets.  Apart 
from explaining supply function equilibrium predictions in the literature, they also provide a 
competition  policy  recommendation  as  the  number  of  power  producers  varies.  They  deliver 
detailed explanations of the market power issues and measure the welfare loss in England and 
Wales market in 1999.  7 
 
3. Pivotal Electricity Suppliers and Market Power 
Suppliers in many markets are able to exercise market power. By withholding some production 
from the market a firm may be able to raise the price of its output and increase its profit. The 
Cournot  oligopoly  model  is  a  well-known  and  often-used  framework  for  analyzing  market 
power. In that model, the amount of market power that any single firm has depends on factors 
such as the price elasticity of demand, the number of firms, the nature of costs of production, and 
on firms’ capacity constraints (if applicable). 
A  number  of  recent  assessments  of  wholesale  electricity  market  performance  have 
emphasized how a single firm could affect the market price in an auction by withholding some 
output from production (see Joskow and Kahn (2001), Lave and Perekhodtsev (2001), Rothkopf 
(2001), Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002), Perekhodtsev et al. (2002), Wolak (2009), and 
Genc and Reynolds (forthcoming)). This single firm, so called “pivotal supplier”, could exercise 
market power and set the market price when his rivals are capacity constrained. Precisely, a firm 
is a pivotal supplier if the total capacity of its rivals is not enough to meet the market demand. A 
pivotal firm or a group of pivotal firms emerge when the market demand/load is high, and/or 
market capacity is low relative to the peak demand. Alternatively, a pivotal supplier may be 
defined as a supplier with positive residual demand, in which residual demand for a supplier is 
total market demand minus the summation of capacity of other generators and total imported 
power.  
Wolak (2009) finds a recent evidence on how pivotal suppliers exercise market power in 
the New Zealand wholesale electricity market. In section 3 (pp. 82-127) of his paper, Wolak 
explains how pivotal suppliers emerge and exercise market power. Furthermore, in his Section 4 
(pp.  127-171),  Wolak  provides  empirical  evidence  on  the  ability  and  incentive  to  exercise 8 
 
unilateral market power by pivotal suppliers. He writes (p. 163), “…In fact, a number of the 
market  power  mitigation  mechanisms  in  United  States  wholesale  markets  are  based  on  this 
supposition. The short-term market operator takes the offers and bids of all market participants 
and determines whether a supplier is pivotal or a set of suppliers are jointly pivotal. If this is the 
case, then the offers of this supplier or this set of suppliers are mitigated to some reference offer 
level that is based on that supplier’s marginal cost of production. Our analysis examines whether 
being pivotal or net pivotal predicts higher offer prices by the supplier after controlling for the 
opportunity  cost  of  water  and  input  fossil  fuel  prices.”  He  says,  (p.  153)  as  a  result  of  the 
empirical study, “…We find that when a supplier is a pivotal its offer prices  are higher by 
economically  significant  magnitudes.”  He  estimates  that  a  supplier  is  pivotal  more  than  50 
percent of the time during the trading periods in the New Zealand market. In a recent empirical 
study, Philpott et al. (2010) investigate production inefficiencies in the New Zealand wholesale 
electricity market. They argue that their model could be used to identify the sources of extensive 
exercise of market power indicated by Wolak (2009) in the New Zealand market. 
A number of studies have examined how production capacity constraints influence the 
range of equilibrium prices under the SFE concept (e.g., see Green and Newbery (1992) and 
Baldick and Hogan (2002)).  Yet these studies have not examined the potential role of the extent 
of excess capacity in the market on equilibrium prices, nor have they shown how the presence of 
pivotal suppliers affects predicted equilibrium supply functions and prices.  These studies point 
out that production capacity constraints may rule out some supply functions as equilibria because 
quantities supplied at equilibrium prices violate one or more capacity constraints. What prior 
SFE studies seem to have missed is that capacity constraints may limit the ability of rival sellers 
to respond to a low supply/high price deviation by any single firm. A deviation from a proposed 9 
 
SFE can be profitable when demand is high and rivals’ ability to increase supply is limited by 
capacity constraints. Capacity constraints can influence the set of supply function equilibria even 
when there is excess capacity in the competitive equilibrium.   
  Genc  and  Reynolds  (forthcoming)  explore  how  capacity  constraints  influence  the 
incentive  to  deviate  from  proposed  supply  function  equilibria  and  thereby  limit  the  set  of 
equilibria.  They formulate a simple model of a wholesale electricity auction in which pivotal 
suppliers dictate the market price.  They examine the connection between pivotal suppliers and 
the set of SFE. They assume that demand varies over time (during the trading period), and is 
perfectly inelastic. In the symmetric model, they consider the case in which players’ marginal 
cost is fixed up to capacity. In another case they assume suppliers have step marginal costs and 
total capacity is equally divided among them. In the asymmetric model, they assume firms are 
different in capacities, and have a common marginal cost for production up to capacity. The 
market price is bounded by a price cap. By withholding output, a pivotal supplier can move the 
market price to the maximum price, or price cap for the market.  There is a continuum of SFE 
and the presence of pivotal suppliers along with capacity constraints helps refine these multiple 
equilibria. In the symmetric and asymmetric versions of the model, they show that when pivotal 
suppliers are present the set of SFE is reduced relative to when no suppliers are pivotal. When 
the pivotal suppliers are present some of the most competitive SFE from the set of equilibria are 
eliminated.  These  SFE  are  eliminated  even  though  they  do  not  violate  capacity  constraints 
anywhere  along  the  proposed  equilibrium  path.  The  extent  to  which  the  equilibrium  set  is 
reduced depends on observable market characteristics such as the extent of excess capacity, the 
demand distribution, the number of suppliers, and the base load capacity factor.  As the amount 
of industry excess capacity falls, and/or the load factor rises, and/or the number of suppliers 10 
 
decreases, and/or the low-cost base load capacity falls in which the base load is less than the off-
peak load level, the set of SFE becomes smaller; the SFE that are eliminated are the lowest-
priced, most competitive equilibria. The firm with the larger share of capacity has an incentive to 
deviate from a wider range of SFE, and it is the larger firm’s deviation incentives that determine 
which SFE are ruled out as equilibrium. 
Another relevant research concerning pivotal suppliers is Perekhodtsev et al. (2002), who 
formulate and analyze a game theoretic model in which symmetric, capacity constrained firms 
submit offers to supply into a uniform price auction. They assume that demand for electricity is   
perfectly inelastic. Their aim is to assess the role that pivotal suppliers play in price formation 
process. They restrict attention to simple bidding strategies in which a firm bids either a “Low” 
price  equal  to  marginal  cost  or  a  “High”  price  equal  to  the  price  cap.  Equilibrium  bidding 
involves mixed strategies in which each firm bids either low or high with specific probabilities. 
The equilibrium probability that the price is high depends on the supply margin, the difference 
between  industry  capacity  and  the  fixed  demand  (load).  As  the  supply  margin  increases  the 
expected price in equilibrium falls. The presence of a single pivotal supplier is associated with a 
high price in their model. They also discuss the notion of a pivotal group of firms – a group of 
firms whose total capacity exceeds the supply margin. They show that market power gradually 
declines as the number of firms that are jointly pivotal rises. To examine the role of pivotal 
suppliers, they assess how observed price-cost margins in the California wholesale electricity 
market during late 2000 vary with the number of pivotal suppliers in the market. They find that 
price cost margins were higher the fewer the number of pivotal suppliers
1. 
 
                                                 
1  It should be noted that their theoretical conclusions are based on a very simple model with only two possible bids, 
and symmetric costs and capacities. 11 
 
4. Discriminatory versus Uniform price Electricity Auctions 
This  section  reviews  market  outcome  predictions  under  two  popular  auction  formats; 
discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. The common auction institution used for day-ahead 
or balancing electricity  markets is the uniform-price auction under which sellers whose bids 
accepted are paid at the market clearing price. On the other hand sellers are paid only at their bid 
price under the discriminatory auction. In 2001 the British Regulatory Authority in the England 
and Wales changed the auction format from uniform-price to discriminatory auction in the hope 
of lower wholesale electricity prices. Recently the Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas 
of  Italy  has  adopted  a  discriminatory  auction  in  their  day-ahead  electricity  market.  Several 
research papers have examined market performance of these auctions under various assumptions. 
Examples include Anwar (1999), Federico and Rahman (2003), Rassenti et al. (2003), Son et al. 
(2004), Fabra et al. (2006), Holmberg (2009), and Genc (2009). Below we discuss these papers 
in detail. 
Anwar (1999) compares the discriminatory and uniform auctions in terms of expected 
cost to the auctioneer in a procurement auction. He studies equilibria in multi-unit common value 
auction model that sometimes provides a positive residual market demand to suppliers by means 
of capacity constraints. His model, similar to Fabra et al. (2006), considers discrete step supply 
offers (i.e., there is a limit on the number of price-quantity pairs offered). The quantity for the 
auction is uncertain and the demand distribution is a common knowledge. There are multiple 
firms each with a unit capacity of supply. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost up to 
capacity,  which  is  a  common  value.  He  shows  that  discriminatory  auction  provides  more 
competitive outcomes and is more efficient for the auctioneer than the uniform auction, when 
capacity  constraints  are  present.  Moreover  he  finds  that  when  demand  is  low,  both  auction 12 
 
formats lead to competitive pricing. When demand is high and firms face some residual demand, 
the uniform auction leads to higher prices than the discriminatory auction. This is because his 
model predicts a unique type of pure strategy equilibrium such that one firm sets its bid at the 
choke-price  (i.e.,  maximum  willingness  to  pay  price)  when  the  rivals  do  not  have  enough 
capacity to meet demand with sure probability. Also in the partially pivotal region (the region in 
which firms are pivotal for sometime during the trading period), he finds that there is no pure-
strategy  equilibrium  in  the  uniform  auction.  These  and  some  of  his  other  findings  are  very 
similar to the results in Fabra et al. (2006).                           
Wolfram (1999) is in favor of the uniform-price auction in the England Wales Electricity 
Pool,  but  she  admits  that  which  auction  format  is  better  (in  terms  of  prices  and  efficiency) 
depends on the market  concentration and factors such as winner’s curse
2 and infra-marginal 
capacity
3 that may significantly affect prices. Kahn et al. (2001) favor the uniform-price auction, 
and claim that the discriminatory auction may cause inefficiencies, because generators will no 
longer bid at their marginal costs, and the tacit collusion that exists within the uniform auction 
may persist in the discriminatory auction. Although wholesale electricity prices have decreased 
in England and Wales after switching to discriminatory auction, Newbery (2003) argues that this 
decrease is due to other factors such as excess market capacity and increased imports.  
                                                 
2 In the sale auctions, winner’s curse refers to winner’s overpayment for a product in the common value with 
incomplete information auction.  In electricity context, which is a common value procurement auction, winner’s 
curse occurs, whether it is a uniform-price or a discriminatory auction, when generators offer low prices for their 
production units. However, to avoid the curse, savvy generators may tend to overbid in the repeated electricity 
auctions.  
 
3 Infra-marginal capacity is the production capacity that is less than the market clearing quantity supplied; whereas 
marginal  capacity  is  the  quantity  that  helps  clear  the  market.  Infra-marginal  plants  generally  supply  base-load 
capacity and marginal plants like thermal generators (petroleum-fired generators) clear the market at higher prices. 
In the uniform-price auction both infra-marginal and marginal plants are paid at the market clearing price. In the 
discriminatory auction, they are paid at their own bid prices.  
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Kahn et al. (2001) reject the idea of switching to discriminatory auction in the following 
reasoning. First, discriminatory auction may cause inefficiencies, if the generators do not bid in their 
marginal costs. Indeed, all of them have incentives to raise their bids so that their fixed and common 
costs are ensured to be paid. However, we note that, under the discriminatory auction generators’ 
(high-price) bidding strategy concerning recovery of their fixed and common costs associated with 
the commitment of the generating units is futile in the electricity markets that employ uplift or make-
whole payments. In many electricity markets fixed costs like startup costs and no-load costs are 
covered  by  system  operators  through  uplift  or  make-whole  payments.  Under  the  uniform-price 
auction these costs are likely to be recovered due to the difference between market-clearing price 
and marginal cost. This may give generators incentives to bid at their marginal costs in the uniform-
price auction. Under the discriminatory auction, nevertheless, it is likely that more costly generators 
might be dispatched more often than less costly generators, if they could not predict the clearing 
prices with accuracy.  Furthermore, another source of inefficiency would be the extra payments 
made for forecasting the market prices. Second, small suppliers might be more disadvantaged under 
pay-as-bid  auction.  Collecting  information  about  rival  bidders  and  estimating  market  outcomes 
period-by-period are more costly per unit of output for small firms than for larger firms. Besides, 
under the uniform-price auction, smaller firms can benefit from the high prices stemming from the 
market power exercised by larger firms. However, under the discriminatory auction, since bidders 
are paid at their offer prices, high prices resulting from market power do not benefit the smaller 
firms. To avoid it, smaller firms would tend to bid at the higher prices. That would increase the 
overall market prices and might cause smaller firms’ bids not being accepted if they overestimated 
the  clearing  prices.  Finally,  tacit  collusion  that is  attributed  to  the  uniform  price  auction  would 
persist for the discriminatory auction, because firms would learn how to collude over time.   14 
 
Klemperer (2002) gives several examples of pitfalls in auction design. His examples mostly 
focus  on  sale  auctions  (demand-side  bidding)  rather  than  procurement  auctions  (supply-side 
bidding). He notes that uniform-price auctions are very vulnerable to collusion, and very likely to 
deter  the  entry,  because  the  repeated  interactions  among  bidders  more  often  enable  them  use 
signaling and punishment strategies. Hence, they learn to cooperate; otherwise, deviation from the 
collusive agreement is unprofitable since higher market-clearing bid would be paid by all bidders.   
However,  in  the  pay-as-bid  sealed-bid-auctions,  he notes  that,  bidders  who  would  require  small 
amounts to trade would be discouraged since their bids rely on the distribution of the rivals’ values, 
which is costly to obtain.         
Federico and Rahman (2003) compare the two auction formats for perfect competition 
and monopoly structures. These are benchmark cases and do not reflect the structure of the real 
wholesale  electricity  markets.  They  analyze  a  model  in  which  each  supplier,  in  a  perfectly 
competitive  model,  sells  one  infinitesimal  unit  of  capacity  to  the  auctioneer  who  meets  a 
uniformly distributed elastic demand. Each supplier has increasing continuous costs and is risk 
neutral and strives to maximize its expected profit.  When they assume that costs are common 
knowledge and the demand is fixed and perfectly inelastic, they find that these two auctions 
result in the same prices and payoffs. However, these results change if demand is inelastic and 
uncertain. In perfect competition, suppliers’ expected profits are lower under the discriminatory 
auction than under the uniform auction. In the monopoly structure, they find that the comparison 
of the auction formats, in terms of average prices, consumer surplus and expected profits, leads 
to mixed results which depend on model parameters.  
Rassenti  et  al.  (2003)  do  experiments  to  rank  the  market  outcomes  under  the 
discriminatory and uniform auctions. Players face computer-generated step-wise elastic demand 15 
 
schedules, which vary among off-peak, shoulder and on-peak periods. Each seller has multiple 
technologies with fixed capacities and submits step function offer schedule to the market. Their 
first finding is that changing auction format from uniform to discriminatory leads to significant 
electricity price increases in the off-peak and shoulder periods. However, auction format change 
has no effect on the on-peak period prices when greater excess capacity exists in the market. 
Their next finding is that for the same level of demand the price variability from trading period 
to trading period is lower under the discriminatory auction than under the uniform auction. They 
state that since in the experimental design there is a greater excess capacity during the peak 
period, low volatility (fewer price spikes) is predicted. However, they admit that this pattern of 
excess capacity is a specific feature of their experimental design. Thus, their volatility results 
cannot be generalized to field environments.   
Son et al. (2004) compare performance of two strategic players, one is with large capacity 
the other is with small capacity, under both auction formats in a market game. Players bid energy 
blocks (with a discrete number of price-quantity pairs) in the auction. They show that expected 
total revenues of players are higher under uniform pricing than under the pay-as-bid pricing. 
They discuss the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium attained under the discriminatory auction, and 
are able to compute it by using an algorithm.  
Fabra  et  al.  (2006)  analyze  a  game-theoretic  model  in  which  firms  with  asymmetric 
capacities and costs submit discrete unit offer schedules (step offer functions) to the auctioneer. 
Most of the their analysis assumes a perfectly inelastic demand with a fixed market reserve 
(maximum) price, constant marginal  cost of production, and production capacity  constraints. 
They compare the Nash equlibria of both auction formats in terms of average prices paid to 
suppliers and productive efficiency. For the fixed demand case, they find that the uniform-price 16 
 
auction  yields  higher  average  prices  than  the  discriminatory  auction  and  their  numerical 
examples  suggest  that  price  differences  can  be  substantial  depending  on  the  total  industry 
capacity, the extent of asymmetry in capacity levels and the price cap. For the uncertain demand 
and perfectly symmetric case, they find that expected payments to suppliers are the same for both 
auctions.  They  also  find  that  for  low  demand  realizations,  equilibrium  is  both  unique  and 
identical; the equilibrium is bidding at the marginal cost of the inefficient supplier for the two 
auction formats. For the asymmetric duopoly case, in the discriminatory auction they find that 
there is no pure strategy equilibrium but only in mixed strategies. 
Most of analysis of Fabra et al. (2006) is based on the assumption that bids are “short-
lived” and are discrete step supply offers. However, these assumptions may not hold for some 
electric power markets. Under uniform-price auction, for some parameter regions in which for 
some  periods  of  time  industry  demand  is  higher  than  rival  firms’  total  available  capacity 
(partially pivotal region) any single firm is pivotal for part, but not all, of the trading period. For 
step  function  bidding,  Fabra  et  al.  find  that  pure  strategy  equilibrium  does  not  exist  for 
parameters in the partially pivotal region; the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. However, they 
do not characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium. In the continuous SFE model, however, Genc 
and  Reynolds  (forthcoming)  find  that  there  are  multiple  pure-strategy  equilibria.  Genc  and 
Reynolds conjecture that predicted market clearing prices for the step function model may be 
either higher or lower than SFE market clearing prices depending on parameter values, when 
parameters are in the partially pivotal region. 
Holmberg  (2009)  compares  the  two  auction  institutions  using  inelastic and  stochastic 
demand. He assumes convex marginal costs and derives SFE with the condition that demand 
exceeds  total  available  industry  capacity  with  positive  probability.  This  is  a  quite  strong 17 
 
assumption.  Based  on  this  condition  he  solves  the  ordinary  differential  equations  of  the 
optimality conditions. He notes that pure strategy equilibrium may not exist in the discriminatory 
auction, if demand follows some specific probability distribution, and concludes that average 
prices are weakly lower in the discriminatory auction. However, he does not characterize any 
mixed strategy equilibrium under the discriminatory auction. 
  Genc (2009) compares the performance of the two auction formats in the presence of 
capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers using continuous offer schedules. He assumes time 
dependent stochastic and perfectly inelastic electric load. Marginal cost of production is common 
knowledge and constant up to the production capacity. The total industry capacity is greater than 
or equal to the peak demand (load). He considers both mixed strategy and pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium in continuous supply function strategies in oligopoly. When capacity constraints are 
non-binding he finds that in the discriminatory auction optimal equilibrium supply function is 
unique and suppliers bid competitively. However, in the uniform auction there is a continuum of 
equilibria as in other SFE models in which equilibrium prices range from marginal cost to the 
price cap. Therefore, each player’s profit in the uniform-price auction is always weakly greater 
than the profit in the discriminatory auction at any time during the trading period. He also finds 
that in the single-step marginal cost case, the functional form of the demand is irrelevant of the 
equilibrium strategies in both auction institutions. When capacity constraints are binding and a 
pivotal supplier emerges he finds that there is no pure strategy SFE under discriminatory auction. 
But there exists mixed strategy equilibrium and he characterizes this equilibrium. Firms offer 
their entire capacity to the market and mix the prices over the equilibrium probability distribution 
functions.  Nevertheless  the  equilibrium  strategies  under  the  uniform-price  auction  are  pure 18 
 
strategies  and  multiple.  As  a  consequence,  expected  profit  per  firm  under  the  uniform-price 
auction is greater or equal to the expected profit per firm under the discriminatory auction.  
  
5. Capacity Investments in Electricity Markets 
One  of  the  essential  arguments  of  electricity  industry  restructuring  is  to  promote  capital 
investments. The importance of capacity investments in restructured electricity markets has been 
stressed by Roques, Newbery, and Nuttall (2005), Murphy and Smeers (2005), Joskow (2007), 
among others. Production capacity investments may help play a key role for mitigating market 
power,  entailing  more  competitive  outcomes  and  ensuring  network  system  reliability.  Since 
power producers face uncertain demand and their investment costs are largely sunk and they face 
competition, they have to make right decisions on timing of investment, type of technology to 
acquire, and an optimal investment behavior before investing. To invest they have to project 
future profitability through growing demand and more efficient production technologies. What 
follows is a brief review of the recent literature examining capacity expansion behavior of firms 
in electricity markets.  
Chaton  and  Doucet  (2003)  study  Hydro-Quebec’s  capacity  expansion  planning  in  a 
stochastic  linear  programming  model.  Hydro-Quebec  is  provincially  owned  monopoly  with 
hydroelectric capacity close to 90% of the total available capacity in the province. The objective 
function  is  minimization  of  total  expected  costs  subject  to  market  clearing  constraint,  and 
transmission  and  production  constraints.  The  uncertainty  stems  from  fuel  costs  and  demand 
growth. The aim is to meet the final period demand by capacity additions (with option values) 
made in earlier periods. They calibrate the model, using the GAMS software, with the data from 19 
 
Hydro-Quebec and neighboring jurisdictions to forecast investment behavior of Hydro-Quebec. 
They conclude that the market conditions do not justify the expansion plan of Hydro-Quebec.  
Murphy  and  Smeers  (2005)  study  generation  capacity  investments  in  open-loop  and 
closed-loop Cournot duopolies. Each duopolist has a different technology (one is a base-load 
plant, the other is a peak-load plant) and makes investment to increase production capacities in 
the face of growing demand. Demand is price sensitive and varies over time deterministically. 
They study two types of settings. In the first, the open-loop game, they assume that production 
capacities are simultaneously built and sold in long-term contracts. In the second, the closed-loop 
game, they assume that there is a time-to-build constraint and the capacities invested in the first 
stage will be available to sell in the second stage in a spot market. They find that equilibrium 
investment levels and production quantities in the closed-loop game are in between the values in 
the open-loop game and the efficient outcomes.  
Bushnell  and  Ishii  (2007)  examine  an  equilibrium  model  of  capacity  investments  in 
electricity markets in which firms make lumpy investment decisions. The model incorporates 
short-run  spot  market  Cournot  competition  and  long-run  Markov  perfect  equilibrium  of 
investments, and the results are based on simulations. They find that incentives to invest depend 
on market positions of the firms. Retail or contractual obligations of the firms also affect the 
investment  decisions  of  the  firms,  for  example,  more  retail  obligations  decrease  the  market 
power of the firms, hence less incentives to invest. When demand growth uncertainty increases, 
they find that firms may delay their investments as the "option-value" of the investment theory 
suggests.  
Garcia  and  Shen  (2010)  characterize  Markov  perfect  equilibrium  capacity  expansion 
plans for oligopoly in which firms face demand uncertainty and investment is not productive 20 
 
immediately (i.e. there is a lag between investment and production). They find, not surprisingly, 
that Cournot firms underinvest relative to the social optimum.  
Garcia and Stacchetti (forthcoming) study a finite horizon discrete time dynamic duopoly 
game.  Production  is  subject  to  capacity  constraints;  firms  have  constant  marginal  cost  of 
production and meet perfectly inelastic demand that has random demand growth component.  
They find that in some equilibria total capacity falls short of demand, and hence system security 
is  jeopardized.  They  also  find  that  increasing  price  caps  does  not  affect  the  market  excess 
capacity and decreasing the price cap benefits the consumers. 
              In a recent paper, Genc and Thille (forthcoming) study competition between thermal 
and hydro electric producers and analyze the choice of capacity by the thermal producer under 
demand  uncertainty  and  characterize  both  the  Markov  perfect  and  S-adapted  open-loop 
equilibria.
4 They assume a low cost hydro generator with a fixed stock of water (since water is 
renewable on a yearly basis through the cycle of inflows). They find that investment is higher 
under Markov perfect information, and this investment may be either higher or lower than the 
efficient  investment  depending  on  model  parameters.  Optimal  investment  function  is 
discontinuous  in  initial  capacity  under  Markov-perfect  equilibrium  and  continuous  in  initial 
capacity under the open-loop equilibrium. These results are different than the findings of Murphy 
and  Smeers  (2005)  and  Garcia  and  Stacchetti  (forthcoming)  who  mostly  assume  symmetric 
technologies with constant cost of production.  
 
                                                 
4 Both Markov perfect equilibrium and (S-adapted) open-loop equilibrium are Nash equilibrium in production and 
investment  strategies.  Markov  perfect  strategies  are  state-dependent,  whereas  open-loop  strategies  are  mainly 
conditioned  on  calendar-time  and  the  decisions  are  made  at  the  outset  of  the  game.  In  a  stochastic  game,  the 
appropriate equilibrium concept with the features of open-loop information is S-adapted open-loop equilibrium. The 
key  difference  between  the  open-loop  equilibrium  and  S-adapted  open-loop  equilibrium  is  that  S-adapted 





The supply function equilibrium (SFE) approach has been employed to study bidding 
behavior of firms and market power issues in power markets as well as in the Treasury bill 
auctions.  In the electricity context there is a growing literature analyzing different aspects of 
power markets using the SFE concept. This literature has considered various extensions of the 
original  SFE  model  introduced  by  Klemperer  and  Meyer  (1989).  These  extensions  include 
equilibrium characterization with capacity constraints, pivotal suppliers, forward contracts, price 
caps, asymmetric players, multi-step-costs, mixed strategies, and different auction institutions. In 
this paper, we review the SFE literature analyzing the effects of above mentioned aspects in the 
wholesale  electricity  markets.  It  appears  that  new  research  papers  will  embed  other 
characteristics  of  electricity  markets  into  the  SFE  models.  The  new  research  directions  may 
include  further  refinement  of  multiplicity  of  SFE,  analysis  of  bidding  behavior  under 
transmission network constraints, and equilibrium characterization in the presence of exports and 
imports made through neighboring jurisdictions in a network.   
  We review power generators’ bidding behavior in the discriminatory and uniform-price 
auctions under various assumptions regarding equilibrium bidding function types (discrete or 
continuous), cost, capacity and the number of firms. We discuss the relevance of the continuous 
supply offers in bidding as opposed to the discrete offers. Importantly, for empirically relevant 
parameter region in many electricity markets we argue that to be able to compute equilibrium 
outcomes it is useful to use continuous supply function bidding rather than step function bidding. 
The  characteristics  of  equilibrium  bidding  strategies  in  both  auction  formats  have  been 
understood. The SFE under the discriminatory auction is unique, but equilibrium is multiple in 
the uniform-price auction when capacity constraints do not bind.  When capacity constraints bind 22 
 
and pivotal suppliers face positive residual demand there is no pure strategy supply function 
equilibrium in the discriminatory auction. The mixed strategy supply function has the property 
that suppliers tend to dump all of their capacity into the market and they employ a mixed strategy 
in which prices are mixed along horizontal supply functions. We argue that offering all of the 
capacity at a single price is more profitable than using multiple bid prices for capacity tranches. 
In a recent paper, Anderson et al. (2010) extend the results of Fabra et al. (2007), Genc (2009), 
and  Holmberg  (2009),  and  show  that  in  the  discriminatory  auction  mixtures  over  strictly 
increasing supply functions are possible in markets with non-pivotal producers, inelastic demand 
and no price cap. With the pivotal suppliers, they obtain the same result as in Genc (2009) that 
the  equilibrium  is  in  horizontal  supply  function  mixtures.  We  conclude  that  although 
discriminatory auction is not easily tractable and gives difficulties to power producers to form 
their optimal supply functions due to the nature of mixed strategies, consumers would gain and 
expected electricity prices would be lower than the ones under the uniform-price auction.                                   
  We also summarize the recent findings on capacity investments in electricity markets.  
The investment in production capacity becomes an important issue in the power industry given 
the growth in electricity demand and the concerns like phasing out environmentally hazardous 
and economically expensive some old smokestack technologies. Several papers examine capital 
investment  issues  in  the  wholesale  electricity  markets  with  or  without  transmission  network 
constraints. Examples include Chaton and Doucet (2003), Murphy and Smeers (2005), Bushnell 
and Ishii (2007), Garcia and Shen (2010), Garcia and Stacchetti (forthcoming), and Genc and 
Thille (forthcoming). These papers consider state-controlled monopoly, perfect competition and 
oligopoly market structures with the open-loop, closed loop, and Markov perfect equilibrium 
concepts  to  examine  the  capacity  expansion  behavior  of  power  producers  in  the  electricity 23 
 
markets in which transmission constraints do not bind. We emphasize on several game theoretic 
settings such as investment game among hydro producers, and investment game between thermal 
and hydro producers under various assumptions. In particular, the degree of overinvestment in 
thermal capacity and the efficiency of water-use are analyzed.  We address hydro and thermal 
player's output and investment behavior under different equilibrium concepts.  We observe that 
the  thermal  player  has  a  strategic  motive  when  choosing  to  invest  in  production  capacity: 
overinvesting in the Markov perfect equilibrium. However, this investment may not be efficient 
and  the  level  of  investment  could  be  above  or  below  the  social  welfare  maximizing  level 
depending on availability of water in the reservoir.  
There  are  recent  papers  addressing  investment  issues  in  electricity  markets  in  the 
presence  of  transmission  constraints,  production  capacity  constraints,  and  time-to-build 
constraints.  For  example,  Genc  and  Zaccour  (2010)  study  long-run  capacity  investment 
dynamics in oligopoly under demand uncertainty. This paper is related to capital accumulation in 
network industries, and, in particular, in electric power generation industry. The main finding of 
the paper is that firms invest in capacity incrementally over time and the investment rule is that 
firms invest as if high demand would unfold in the future. Implications of this finding for the 
electricity industry are, a) firms need to see growth in electricity demand to be able to invest in 
generation capacity; b) firms’ investments are not lumpy and not made just at once, but made 
incrementally over time; c) firms have to invest before the realization of the demand, whether it 
turns out to be high or low, because of the lag between investment and production. Another 
example of such papers is Dijk et al. (2010), where capacity investment and access regulation in 
electricity  markets  are  examined  using  the  real  options  approach.  They  consider  entry  and 
investment incentives of firms in the presence of a transmission network in which nodal prices 24 
 
guide the efficient use of transmission system. They find that with nodal pricing and financial 
transmission rights firms tend to overinvest relative to the efficient investment.  
  A future research direction would be studying supply function equilibria in the presence 
of transmission constraints, which could change the biding behavior significantly. Wilson (2008) 
presents first order optimality conditions of a firm submitting supply functions to ISO in a simple 
transmission network. However, he cannot solve for the optimal bid schedules (supply functions) 
since they depend on the probability distribution of random demand shocks and transmission 
capacity, unlike in optimal bidding models with no network constraints. It would be challenging 
but valuable to know the characteristics of optimum supply functions and price distributions, and 
whether the market outcomes are less competitive when transmission system limits the power 
flow in certain directions in the network.  
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